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1 Introduction
Ten years have passed since the Asian financial crisis.
With the benefit of hindsight, we are now in a much
better position to grasp the nature of the crisis and
digest the lessons that we thought we had learnt
during the years since the crisis.
There is no doubt whatsoever that, over the past ten
years since the crisis, the Chinese economy has been
performing extremely well. In 2006, China’s growth
rate of GDP was 10.7 per cent, with an inflation rate
around 2 per cent (though in the last quarter of
2006, the inflation rate showed some acceleration).
In 2006, China’s current account and capital account
surpluses were US$170 billion and US$60 billion,
respectively. The growth rate of net exports was
more than 70 per cent, after having registered a
growth rate of 220 per cent in 2005. Although the
Chinese Renminbi (RMB) exchange rate has
appreciated by about 6 per cent against the US
dollar since July 2005, the appreciation pressure on
the RMB is unabated. To maintain the stability of the
RMB, the Chinese monetary authorities have
intervened in the foreign exchange market
constantly. China has run twin surpluses – current
account surplus and capital account surplus – for
more than one and a half decades. As a result,
China’s foreign exchange reserves have surpassed
US$1 trillion and are expected to increase
continuously at a rate of US$200 billion a year.
However, in recent years many observers of the
Chinese economy have had a feeling of déjà vu and
discussions about how far China is away from a crisis
have re-emerged. The aim of this article is to identify
the key threats to China’s economic stability in the
near future and discuss how China can prevent a crisis
from happening in the face of these threats. In
Section 2, the main lessons for China of the Asian
financial crisis are highlighted. In Section 3, drawing
on the experience of the Asian financial crisis, the
main points of vulnerability of China’s financial
system, the banking system in particular, are identified
and their reforms examined. Section 4 is about the
dilemma China’s monetary authorities have been
facing since China’s reform of its exchange rate
regime on 21 July 2005. Section 5 is about the role
of capital controls in China’s crisis prevention. The last
section contains concluding remarks.
2 The lessons China has learnt from the Asian
financial crisis
The experience of the Asian financial crisis has been
studied carefully in China. There are three major
lessons to which China has paid particular attention.
2.1 Lesson 1: A healthy financial system is the key
for sustainable growth
All crisis-hard-hit countries had a fragile financial
system characterised by high non-performing loan
ratio and low capital adequacy. The crisis-affected
countries’ experience shows that high non-
performing ratio resulting from reckless lending in
boom time will lead to bankruptcy of financial
institutions when the economy is in a downturn. The
insolvency of one or two major financial institutions
caused by non-performing loans can lead to the
breakdown of a whole array of financial institutions
and bring the economy into a deep recession as
happened in Thailand and some other East Asian
countries during the Asian financial crisis. The credit
crunch caused by non-performing loans can also lead
to a long-drawn deflation similar to that seen in
Japan in the 1990s.
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With a healthy well-regulated financial system,
reckless credit expansion tends not to happen in the
first place. When an economy slows down due to
internal and/or external shocks or cyclical factors,
with a healthy financial system, bank run and capital
flight normally will not happen. When a currency is
under attack, for whatever reason, with a healthy
financial system, the monetary authorities will be
able to raise the interest rate as high as necessary to
defend its currency. In contrast, with a fragile
financial system, interest rate hikes will lead to
massive bankruptcy of financial institutions and
enterprises. Therefore, the restructuring of the
financial system, especially the banking system, has
become the foremost important task of China’s
economic reform since the second half of the 1990s.
2.2 Lesson 2: The exchange rate should be flexible
as well as stable
Experience shows that a stable and competitive
exchange rate is essential for an export-oriented
developing country. However, an inflexible exchange
rate will risk a balance of payments crisis and a
currency crisis when it is overvalued, or create
economic bubbles and inflation when it is
undervalued. A flexible exchange rate would make
currency misalignment smaller and trade account
more balanced. A timely relief of appreciation or
devaluation pressure by exchange rate adjustment
would contain excessive capital movement and make
a big correction less necessary. In contrast, an
inflexible exchange rate postpones a necessary
adjustment, accumulates misalignment and
eventually results in drastic correction with
devastating consequences for the economy. For most
Asian countries, because of the liberalisation of
capital account, a flexible exchange rate will allow
them to maintain the independence of monetary
policy.
2.3 Lesson 3: The liberalisation of capital control
should be implemented in a steady and orderly
fashion
The liberalisation of capital controls will make the
cross-border allocation of resources more efficient
by eliminating the rent-seeking opportunity and
reducing the social cost of the evasion of the capital
control. However, Asian countries’ experience shows
that due to the fragility of the financial system and
weak corporate governance, large fluctuations of the
exchange rate caused by free movement of capital
flows can be too disruptive for the economy in
general and for the trade sector in particular. On the
one hand, developing countries need independent
monetary policy, due to a lack of synchronisation of
economic cycles with major developed countries. On
the other hand, they need to maintain a significant
degree of exchange rate stability, because of the
structural rigidity of their economies. To strike a
balance, they must maintain a certain degree of
control over capital flows (Williamson 1995).
For developing countries, capital flows are inherently
destabilising, because their financial markets are too
shallow. Free movements of capital more often than
not exacerbate economic instability (Rodrick 1998).
Before the Asian financial crisis, due to the large
interest rate differences between Thai assets and
foreign assets, Thai financial institutions borrowed
heavily from abroad, from Japan in particular, and
then lent the money to domestic borrowers. The
‘carry trade’ enabled financial institutions to earn
huge profits. The reckless lending by financial
institutions created estate and equity bubbles. When
the bubbles burst, many financial institutions became
either illiquid or insolvent. Some financial institutions
went bankrupt. The fall of major financial institutions
led to panic and a run on banks. Capital flows
reversed suddenly. The capital flight led to the
currency crisis. According to Thai economists, the
Thai financial crisis can be best characterised as a
‘capital account crisis’. The sudden reversal of capital
flows was the single most important culprit of the
crisis. Capital inflows can increase dramatically out of
irrational exuberance, and capital outflow can also
increase dramatically out of irrational panic (Radelet
and Sachs 1998; Woo et al. 2000). The question of
what triggered the Asian crisis is not important –
triggers can present themselves at any time. The key
is how to manage capital flows in an effective
fashion. Ideally, whatever happens, developing
countries should be able to manage the movement
of capital in such a way that capital flows cannot
reverse suddenly. The opening of the financial service
sector should not be allowed to lead to automatically
opening the capital account.
There are many other important lessons that we
have learned. For example, the lack of regional
financial cooperation was one important reason for
the failure of the Asian countries.
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3 China’s financial fragilities and China’s
reform of the banking system
China’s banks, like in all crises-hit East Asian countries,
once were beset by high non-performing loan ratios,
low capital adequacy and poor corporate governance.
As pointed out by Lardy, ‘the most serious threat to
macroeconomic stability in China is the possibility of a
domestic banking crisis … The central precondition for
a crisis, a largely insolvent banking system, already
exists’.1 Because of the similarity between China and
the crisis-hit East Asian countries in terms of financial
fragility, many scholars and economic journals
repeatedly predicted that the Chinese economy
would fall. Although these predictions have failed to
materialise so far, there is no reason for China to be
complacent. No-one can rule out the possibility that
a financial crisis of some kind may occur in China in
the foreseeable future.
3.1 High non-performing loan (NPL) ratio
In 1998, China’s true non-performing loan ratio was
perhaps higher than those reported in Thailand and
Korea prior to the onset of the Asian financial crisis
in 1997. The lesson of the 1980s is that financial
distress is likely to become systemic when non-
performing loans, net of provisions, reach 15 per cent
of total loans. In the late 1990s, China officially
admitted that the highest NPL/loan ratio was about
25 per cent. After the Asian financial crisis, the high
NPL ratio was identified as the most vulnerable
point of the Chinese economy. Efforts were taken to
deal with this problem head on. From 1995 to 1998,
a large amount of debts had been re-scheduled and
190 billion yuan in bad loans had been struck off the
book. To write-off bad loans, the banks must provide
corresponding loan loss provision. According to the
international standard, the loan loss provision should
be 1.25 per cent of total bank loans. In China, before
1987, there was no requirement for loan loss
provision. Since 1992 the ratio was 0.5 per cent, and
on top of it, 0.1 per cent was requested to be added
each year, until the ratio increased to 1 per cent.
To speed up the process of reducing the NPL ratio,
in 1999, four asset management companies (AMCs)
were established to securitise banks’ non-performing
loans. For the operation of the AMCs the following
procedures were adopted: (a) AMCs buy commercial
banks’ NPLs at face-value (1:1); (b) banks increase their
holding of cash injected by AMCs and reduce the
same amount of assets (NPLs); (c) AMCs achieve the
controlling shares of the enterprises that had
borrowed from the banks and failed to repay their
debts. AMCs will restructure the enterprises so as to
make them profitable in four years; (d) AMCs’
holding would last only four years. In the end, they
must sell their share on the market. They had to try
to achieve a recovery ratio as high as possible (30 per
cent would be fine); (e) eventually, AMCs’ losses
would be footed by the ministry of finance.
The funds of AMCs were mainly obtained from the
following sources: (1) The Ministry of Finance (initial
capital and follow-up capital); (2) Sales of Special
Bonds guaranteed by the Ministry of Finance;
(3) Borrowing from banks. Table 1 summarises the
process of writing off non-performing loans by
AMCs in China since the late 1990s until recently.
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Table 1 Balance sheet of AMCs
Assets Liabilities
1,400 billion yuan NPLs 570 billion yuan PBOC re-lending
–405 billion yuan NPLs 820 billion yuan financial bonds
+405 billion equities
–866 billion yuan NPLs
+181 billion yuan cash
Capital
40 billion yuan injection by the ministry of finance
Source Nafang Zhoumo (2006) Southern Weekend 28 September: C22. PBOC, The People’s Bank of China.
From Table 1, it can be seen that the AMCs helped
banks to eliminate 1,400 billion yuan NPLs off their
books. Among them, 405 billion yuan NPLs were
swapped for equities of the enterprises that owned
the debts, and 866 billion yuan bad loans were sold
to domestic and international investors.
According to the design, the AMCs life expectancy is
ten years.2 Before the end of their lifetime, AMCs
should sell their holding of bad loans at a discount.
The potential buyers of AMC assets are:
(1) enterprises that participated in the debt-equity
swap programme, if they become profitable later;
(2) holding companies of the enterprises whose debt
have been taken over by AMCs; (3) local
governments and other enterprises in the locality;
(4) stock market, if the companies will be able to be
listed on the market after restructuring and their
shares are salable; (5) foreign buyers.
China’s debt-equity swap programme is still in
progress. Owing to the moral hazard involved, many
economists are sceptical about the programme. It
seems that lack of effective capital markets in which
the value of bad debts and collateral can be
measured objectively is the key obstacle for the
smooth implementation of the programme. By the
end of April 2006, among the disposed NPLs of
866.34 billion yuan by the four asset management
companies, 180.56 billion yuan was recovered. The
cash recovery rate is 24.2 per cent.3
The cost of cleaning up the banking system is
extremely high. In fact, according to an official from
The People’s Bank of China (PBOC), 5 trillion yuan
were spent.4 In the future, having cleaned up their
books with the help of the Ministry of Finance, the
four asset management companies will perhaps be
re-shaped into investment banks into which strategic
investors will be invited.5
Owing to the writing off of NPLs as well as the
rapid expansion of bank loans over the past several
years, Chinese Banks’ NPL ratio has fallen to a
comfortable level. By the end of the first-quarter of
2005, the total amount of NPLs of China’s
commercial banks was 1,800 billion yuan, and the
NPL ratio fell to 12.4 per cent.
3.2 Low capital adequacy
Low capital adequacy was another important point
of vulnerability in China’s banking system. In 1998, in
order to raise the capital adequacy of the four banks
from 3.5 per cent to 8 per cent, 270 billion RMB was
injected by the PBOC. The steps taken by the PBOC
went as follows.
First, the PBOC lowered the reserve requirement
from 13 per cent to 8 per cent, and scrapped the
excess reserve requirement. As a result, 270 billion
RMB reserve assets were released from the balance
sheet of the PBOC. Second, the four banks used the
270 billion RMB to buy the special bonds issued by
the government (Table 2).
Third, the government injected the 270 billion RMB
into the four banks as capital. The end result of this
operation is that on the asset side of the balance
sheet of the four banks, there is an increase in
government bond holding of 270 billion RMB, and
on the liability side of the balance sheet of the four
banks, there is a corresponding increase in capital in
exchange for equity rights (Table 3).
There are some important features of the
government bonds:
z The maturity of the government special bonds is
30 years. The government should have no
problem in redeeming the bonds.
z The special bonds can be traded in the inter-bank
bond market. The liquidity of the special bonds is
good.
z The interest rate of the bonds is 7.2 per cent
which means that the government has to pay
interest of 19.4 billion yuan. The government can
expect to be compensated by collecting more tax
on bank profits, if the banks have improved their
profitability, owing to the re-capitalisation.
As a result of the re-capitalisation, the four major
banks’ capital adequacy reached 8 per cent. It was
ascertained at the time that in the next 4–7 years,
the adequacy of the four could be maintained at that
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Table 2 The preparation for the injection
Assets Liabilities
Reserves (–270)
Govt. bonds (+270)
Capital
level. The optimism of the assertion was proved
wrong just a few years later. After this and another
bailout action later, further loan losses quickly eroded
the banks’ capital bases. Consequently, more bailouts
were carried out in 2004.6
In 2004, the Chinese government decided to inject
public money into China’s troubled commercial banks
again. This time, US$45 billion out of China’s huge
foreign exchange reserves were injected into two big
state-owned banks, Bank of Construction of China
and Bank of China. The Chinese authorities have
been frustrated by the lack of progress in the
banking reform. The need for re-capitalisation only
four years after the first injection of 270 billion yuan
is a clear demonstration of the failure of the old
approach. The new thinking behind the Chinese
monetary authorities’ decision is that the
participation of international strategic investors is a
necessary condition for the success of its bank
reforms. The purpose of the re-capitalisation is aimed
at making the books of the two banks up to
international standards so that the IPO can be made
and international strategic investors can be attracted
as soon as possible. In 2006 another large capital
injection of US$15 billion was made for China’s
largest commercial bank, Industrial and Commercial
Bank of China (ICBC).
Foreign exchange reserves are not net assets of the
public sector, and they were invested by the central
bank in the banks via a new state company called
Central Huijin Investment Company which is owned
by the PBOC. As a result of capital injection, Hujin
Investment Company became the sole owner of the
commercial banks (100 per cent shareholder of the
two banks). In order to prevent any inflationary
effect of the injection, the foreign exchange reserves
received by the banks are not allowed to purchase
RMB for domestic spending. Later, the third bank,
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China also
received capital injection.
Because of the improvement in capital base and
profitability, the three banks were listed in Hong
Kong successfully. US$42 billion capital was raised.
‘International strategic investors’ became important
minority shareholders. Bank of China (BOC) raised
US$9.7 billion in its IPO, Construction Bank of China
(CBC) US$ 9.2 billion, and Industrial and Commercial
Bank of China (ICBC) US$21.9 billion (the largest ever
IPO in the world). The soaring share prices made
ICBC the world’s largest bank. So far China’s three big
commercial banks that have received the injection
have been doing well. However, whether there is a
fundamental improvement in corporate governance
of these banks is still too early to tell. Indeed, after
bad debt write-off, capital injection, public listing,
installation of new IT equipment and other technical
progression, China’s commercial banks have come up
to international standards. However, I am not sure
whether those more fundamental problems within
China’s banking system, such as nepotism,
incompetence, susceptibility to government
intervention and low efficiency have been solved. The
cost of the banking reform over the past ten years
has been enormous. It is not very likely that China’s
fiscal position will allow China to do the same a
second time in the future, if China’s commercial
banks fall into serious trouble again. The upside of the
capital injection is to provide commercial banks with a
fresh start. The downside of the capital injection is the
worsening of moral hazard. Few people within the
banks are punished because of their misbehaviour.
Who cares about good behaviour, if every one
believes that the government will pick up the pieces
eventually? Maybe the new shareholders care, but to
what extent the so-called strategic investors can play
a role to improve the banks’ corporate governance
remains to be seen.
3.3 Strengthening banking supervision
Finally, a number of measures have been adopted
aimed at strengthening banking supervision.
New decrees and regulations have been enacted to
strengthen management and risk preventions. The
increased efforts to conduct prudential supervision
by the central bank achieved significant results. First,
the segregation of commercial banking, trust and
securities business generally has been completed.
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Table 3 Final shape of the balance sheet
Assets Liabilities
Cash injection (+270)
Reserves (–270)
Govt. bonds (+270)
Capital
Government share (+270)
Second, the licensing of banking institutions and the
fit and proper test for senior management have
been further improved. Third, the central bank
strengthened its ability to conduct analysis of
supervisory information on commercial banks
through off-site supervision as well as its capacity for
early detection of risks. The commercial banks were
informed on a quarterly basis of the results of off-
site supervision. Fourth, the supervision of banks was
also strengthened by strong enforcement actions.
Fifth, some emerging financial risks were reduced.
Last but not least, the China Banking Regulatory
Commission (CBRC) was established to take overall
charge of the supervision of China’s banks. Since its
establishment, banking supervision has been
significantly strengthened.
4 Trilemma facing China’s monetary authorities
While the institutional reforms of China’s financial
system have been implemented over the past
decade, as a response, to a large extent, to the Asian
financial crisis, China has run into a new
macroeconomic situation (Wang 2006). In contrast
to East Asian countries before the crisis, which ran
large current account deficits, China has run current
account surpluses and capital account surpluses
constantly since the early 1990s (Yongding 2005). In
order to maintain the stability of the RMB exchange
rate, the PBOC has intervened heavily in the foreign
exchange market. The massive intervention means
that the PBOC has injected huge amount of high
powered money into the banking system. As a result,
excessive liquidity has increased rapidly over the past
three years.
Since late 2002, growth of the Chinese economy has
accelerated. The growth rate of fixed assets investment
has been very high; more than double of the growth
rate of GDP (Figure 1). By the end of 2005, according
to official sources, the investment rate was 48.6 per
cent of GDP.7 The government is worried about
overcapacity in years to come. Given the initial
conditions as of 2005, the investment rate could be
approaching 100 per cent in less than a decade.
On top of the high growth rate of Fixed-Asset
Investment (FAI), soaring housing prices is another
important concern for the government (Table 4). The
rapid rise of housing prices not only intensifies
speculation in the real estate sector and hence leads
to the creation of bubbles, but also causes the anger
of the public. More recently, China’s share prices are
also soaring, which cannot be explained by the
improvement in fundamentals. Indeed, the correction
that happened in February 2007 could not be
explained by deteriorating fundamentals either.
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Figure 1 Growth rate of fixed assets investment vis-à-vis that of GDP
Note The GDP growth rate is in real terms. That of FAI does not remove price factor. However, since 1997,
China's inflation rate has been very modest. Even taking the price factor into consideration, the growth rate
of FAI is assumed higher that 20% per annum since 2003.
Sources China Statistical Yearbook, various issues, National Bureau of Statistics.
In 2006, China’s inflation was just 1.5 per cent.
However, in December of 2006, the annualised
growth rate of Consumer Price Index (CPI) rose to
2.8 per cent. Therefore, inflation is still on the radar
screen of the PBOC.
To slow down the growth rate of FAI, contain real
estate bubbles and maintain price stability, the PBOC
has adopted a tight monetary policy. However, other
things being equal, tight monetary policy means
higher interest rates, which in turn means more
capital inflows and higher pressure on RMB
appreciation. It is obvious that China’s aim of the
maintenance of the stability of the RMB exchange
rate is in direct contradiction with that of a tight
monetary policy. To overcome this contradiction, in
other words, to maintain both the stability of the
RMB and the tightness of monetary policy at the
same time, the PBOC has carried out a large-scale
sterilisation operation to mop-up the excessive
liquidity created by the central bank’s intervention in
the foreign exchange market.
Owing to the enormous scale of the sterilisation
operation, in just three years, the PBOC sold out all
the government bonds it had accumulated since
1998 when the government started to issue
government bonds to stimulate a deflationary
economy. The exhaustion of the bond holding by the
PBOC means that there is no more room for the
central bank to manipulate the asset side of its
balance sheet. It turned to the liability side. In 2003,
the PBOC began to issue central bank bills to mop
up the excessive liquidity.
The key question is whether sterilisation can be
carried out unlimitedly. Theoretically speaking, as
long as the interest rates paid by the central bank on
its bills is lower than the corresponding interest rates
of American assets, e.g. the yields of treasury bills,
the central bank should be able to carry on with
sterilisation infinitively, and hence to maintain an
effective control of the monetary base. However,
the sale of central bank bills will push up the interest
rates in money markets, which in turn will invite
more capital inflows, and hence create the need for
more sterilisation. This certainly is a not a sustainable
process. Furthermore, to prevent the sterilisation
from causing interest rates to rise, the PBOC
sometimes issues the so-called designated central
bank bills to commercial banks, which commercial
banks have to buy with prices higher than the market
prices. Because commercial banks have to buy
increasingly large amounts of low yield central bank
bills, their profitability will fall. Lower profitability will
create a long-term negative impact on the fragile
banking system.
On top of sterilisation by selling central bank bills,
the PBOC has raised the reserve requirement rate
seven times since 2003. By raising reserve
requirements, a large amount of liquidity has been
frozen. In fact, the increase in reserve requirements
was the first important measure taken by the PBOC
since the Chinese economy bottomed out from
deflation that had started in 1997. In a typical market
economy, the central bank will refrain from changing
reserve requirements, because the measure is
regarded as too drastic and clumsy. However, this
seems not to be a problem for the Chinese
economy. Though the rise of reserve requirements
will cause some problems for commercial banks, the
latter can adapt to the new situation by various
measures. For commercial banks, the simplest way to
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Table 4 Beijing’s housing market 2003–6
Year Average price Growth rate Value of total Growth rate Volume of Growth rate 
(yuan/m2) of average sale of value of sale (unit: of volume of 
price (%) total sale (%) 10,000 m2) sale (%)
2003 6,438 812 1,262
2004 6,178 –4 1,608 98 2,602 106
2005 7,534 22 1,670 4 2,217 –15
2006 8,792 17 2,011 20 2,288 3
Source Website of Beijing’s Management of Housing and Real Estate Transactions. Reference News
(19 January 2007).
respond to the tightening is to shift a proportion of
excess reserves, which are kept for the purpose of
settlement by commercial banks, into the account of
mandatory reserves. However, the key issue here is
that the increase in reserve requirement rate means
increased tax on commercial banks, which certainly
will impact negatively on commercial banks’
performances.
In summary, to achieve simultaneously the objectives
of the maintenance of a stable exchange rate, a tight
monetary policy and a good performance of the
commercial banks is impossible. If the government
wishes to achieve the three objectives at the same
time, some compromise among these three
objectives must be made. In fact, the PBOC has
implemented a moderately tight monetary policy,
and the excessive liquidity is not fully sterilised. At the
same time, the RMB is allowed to re-value gradually
so as to reduce the burden of the PBOC on
sterilisation. Under these circumstances, all three
objectives have been taken care of, but none of
them have been achieved completely.
5 China’s financial stability and capital account
liberalisation in the next five years
Despite its extremely good economic performance in
terms of growth rate and inflation, China has been
confronted with increasingly serious structural
problems. First, China’s natural environment has been
deteriorating. Second, its energy consumption has
been soaring. Third, the gap of income distribution in
China has been widening. Last but not least, China’s
current account imbalance has been worsening.
Decision-makers have realised that China cannot
carry on with its old investment and export-driven
growth strategy, no matter how successful it was.
However, the adjustment of the growth strategy
aimed at achieving a more balanced growth pattern
cannot be completed in a short period of time.
Personally, I think it at least will take five years.
Because the twin surpluses and other imbalances will
persist for quite a long time and the government has
set to achieve the three contradictory objectives
simultaneously, China’s financial stability is likely to be
compromised somewhat during the period of
adjustment. Although it is entirely possible that
China will muddle through again this time, it
definitely will not be plain sailing. The Chinese
government has to be extremely careful about
excessive liquidity-led asset bubbles and/or inflation.
If China succeeds in maintaining the financial stability
for another five years, the Chinese economy may
eventually enter into a sustainable growth path.
The Chinese government does not wish to allow the
RMB to appreciate rapidly and hence the process of
appreciation of the RMB may last for many years –
five years at least, in my view. During this period of
time, cross-border capital will continue to flow in to
push up the RMB exchange rate and flood the
economy with liquidity. Under this circumstance, the
last line of defence left for the government in its
effort to prevent a balance of payment crisis and
currency crisis is to improve the management of
capital flows so as to reduce speculative capital
inflows and encourage orderly capital outflows,
especially outflows in the form of outbound FDI.
Since 1979, foreign capital inflows in general and FDI
in particular have played a key role in China’s
economic growth. Based on the lessons of the debt
crisis of Latin American countries in the 1980s, China
adopted a cautious attitude towards liberalisation of
capital flows from the beginning. For many years,
observers had criticised China for being too slow in
liberalising the capital account. The Chinese
government itself also felt embarrassed by the
slowness. However, suddenly the shortcoming
became a virtue when the Asian financial crisis broke
out. Although China’s financial system was as fragile
as those crisis-affected countries in the region, if not
worse, the Chinese currency (the RMB) escaped
attacks by international speculators. In the wake of
the Asian financial crisis, the pace of capital account
liberalisation in China slowed down.
However, in recent years, capital account
liberalisation again became a focus of policy debate.
There are two main factors behind the recent
changes. The first is China’s commitment to open
the financial services sector as a part of WTO deal
signed in December 2001. The second are the tactics
used by the Chinese monetary authorities for
reducing appreciation pressure on the RMB. The
tactics have taken the form of ‘yanjin kuangchu’ (strict
control over capital inflows and loosening control
over capital outflows) policy.
However, despite the new policy of yanjin kuanchu,
capital inflows have continued to flow in rapidly
through the current account as well as the capital
account. The destinations of these capital inflows are
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China’s money markets and capital markets,
especially China’s real estate markets and stock
markets. So far, there is no hard data on how much
speculative capital has flown into what markets.
Some argue that at least one-third of China’s
current account surplus in 2006 is disguised capital
inflows though over-invoicing exports and under-
invoicing imports. I prefer to think that most
speculative capital might have entered China via the
capital account and ended up with China’s stock
markets and real estate markets.
To channel speculative capital on a large scale across
borders into China is not difficult. For example, there
are numerous Taiwanese companies with a certain
amount of registered capital. However, capital is
allowed to be injected gradually over the years. To
utilise these loopholes, hedge funds can put money
into those enterprises’ accounts as injected capital,
legally with a price. Then this money will leave the
account of these corporations and enter into their
subsidiaries’ accounts. Now it is entirely legal for these
subsidiaries to put the money into their accounts held
by securities companies on behalf of them to buy
shares. According to a report, one person once single
handedly channelled US$700 million into stock
markets in the short timespan of one month.8
I have strong reservations about China’s policy of
yanjin kuanchu. Stricter control over capital inflows is
correct. However, loosening control over capital
outflows will not be very helpful for relieving the
pressure on the RMB exchange rate. On the contrary,
in my view, loosening control over capital outflows
will encourage rather than discourage capital inflows,
especially speculative capital inflows. If it is so easy to
run away, why not come and have a go first?
Temptation for buying Chinese assets is too great to
resist. First, China’s real estate and financial assets are
cheap in terms of foreign currencies. Even without
RMB appreciation, they are worthwhile to buy.9
Second, the RMB is expected to appreciate by at least
25 per cent in years to come, by international
investors. Third, the potential for the prices of
Chinese assets to rise is great. For example, until late
2005, China’s share price was less than 1,300 points
and now it has broken the threshold of 3,000 points.
Though the share price is no longer cheap, the
potential for China’s other financial and real assets to
rise is still great. Fourth, Chinese interest rates are
higher than corresponding international interest rates,
especially higher than those of Japanese interest
rates. (Why is there not more carry trade?) Fifth, the
Chinese government’s repeated injections of capital
into troubled commercial banks makes foreign as well
as domestic investors believe that the Chinese assets
are not risky at all because of the implicit guarantees
by the government. Sixth, China’s huge foreign
exchange reserves are the ultimate collaterals for all
foreign investment. What can be more reassuring?
Under these circumstances, probably only two kinds of
capital will be eager to utilise opportunities provided
by the ‘loosening control over capital outflows’ to flow
out of China: the unwinding speculative capital and
money that needs to be bleached. Legitimate
outbound investment and remittance of investment
incomes already have channels in place to move out of
the borders without undue difficulties. However, even
this legitimate outbound investment should be
carefully monitored and supervised. China should not
repeat Japan’s painful experience immediately after
the Plaza accord, when the Japanese bought foreign
assets gleefully and then lost almost all of them a few
years later. Without careful monitoring and
supervising, the results of the disorderly outflows of
Chinese capital will fare much worse than the
Japanese who went on a buying spree two decades
ago. Prasad pointed out that ‘many of the emerging
markets with closed capital accounts have underlying
fragilities like a huge fiscal deficit, a banking sector
with significant non-performing loans, or an opaque
corporate non-financial sector, which make full capital
account convertibility risky’. On top of the usual
problems with developing countries’ capital outflows,
China is a country without clearly defined property
rights. A great portion of public assets have been
stolen quietly by the so-called stealth privatisation. To
channel the stolen money to Virgin Island and/or
Cayman Island is the best ending for the thievery. For
some state-owned enterprises, managers can be very
careless about whether other people’s money will go
down the drain, because of a lack appropriate
incentive mechanisms and low morality. In short,
before further institutional reform is accomplished,
and right corporate governance is put in place, to
encourage capital outflows for the purpose of
relieving the pressure on RMB appreciation is indeed
‘putting the cart before the horse’.
Some in China argue that capital control is ineffective
anyway and hence why bother? I agree that China’s
capital control is extremely leaky. However, it is not
right to underestimate the effectiveness of capital
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control all together, when the authorities are
determined to make it effective. At least, the
government can do something to increase the
transaction cost to the illegitimate cross-border
capital flows. Though the Thai government was
criticised universally for its bungled recent efforts in
managing capital flows, the episode shows that how
to manage capital flows again has become the
priority of macroeconomic policy. Thai monetary
authorities’ recent actions aimed at stopping
speculative capital inflows are understandable,
although mistakes have been made in terms of tactics
and technicalities. The Thai experience also shows that
after the firewall has been torn down, it is extremely
difficult to re-erect it. Efforts in restoring some
control over capital movement will cause stronger
reactions by foreign investors than if the control has
not been dismantled yet. Therefore, China should not
be in a hurry to dismantle capital control. Rather it
should improve its management of capital flows.
In my view, at this moment, the stability of the
Chinese economy hinges on the success of China’s
management of capital flows. China’s household
saving deposits amount to 17 trillion yuan (US$2.3
trillion) and account for 85 per cent of GDP in 2006.
We cannot rule out the possibility that Chinese
households suddenly decided that they should hold a
certain proportion, e.g. 20 per cent of their savings
in the form of foreign assets. If diversification
happens, the total amount of capital outflows will
amount to US$400 billion. Furthermore, China’s FDI
stock must be greater than US$500 billion and the
corresponding investment income outflows can be
as high as US$50 billion to US$100 billion. Finally,
China’s balance of foreign borrowing is US$305
billion, among which, short-term borrowing is
US$169 billion. If capital flows reverse, due to
whatever reasons rational or irrational, the total
amount of capital outflow in a short span can be as
high as half a trillion US dollars. If reversal happens,
the consequences will be very grave indeed.
Therefore, in my view, if China makes a fatal mistake
in the next five years, the mistake will be the
premature abandonment of capital controls aimed at
reducing RMB appreciation pressure.
6 Conclusion
Some ten years after the Asian financial crisis, the
Asian economy is in much better shape. The recovery
of the Asian economy shows that the Asian miracle
is true. Asia has the will and ability to continue its
miracle to further narrow its gap with the developed
economies. However, it should be recognised that all
is not well in Asia. Ten years after the Asian financial
crisis, Asian economies are facing similar challenges
and threats. All East Asian economies are facing
appreciation pressure. All East Asian economies are
facing speculative capital inflows. History will not
repeat itself in the exact same way. But something
wrong, and suspiciously familiar, is apparent. Asian
economies should raise vigilance. Otherwise, we will
once again fall prey of predators in the form of
hedge funds and private equity funds. With
experience we have learnt, if we fail this time,
besides ourselves, there is no one we can blame.
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Notes
* This article was prepared for the Bangkok
Conference, 25–26 February 2007, part of an IDS,
Thai Development Research Institute and Seoul
University project.
1 See Is China Stable, by Shambaugh, D. and
Sharpe, M.E., eds (1999) New York: Armonk.
2 Now AMCs will be transformed into certain non-
bank financial institutions.
3 Nafang Zhoumo (2006) Southern Weekend
28 September: C22.
4 See: http://finance.sina.com.cn (accessed 24 April
2006).
5 Nafang Zhoumo (2006) Southern Weekend
28 September: C22.
6 It is worth mentioning that the 270 billion RMB
special government bonds are long-term bonds. The
maturity is 30 years. The bonds are marketable in
the inter-bank bond market, and hence liquid. The
coupon interest rate of the bonds is 7.2 per cent p.a.
7 Later, different figures were provided. So far, there
is no commonly accepted official figure of the
investment rate. Most Chinese economists think
the figure should be between 40 and 45 per cent.
8 Dai, Y. (2007) ‘A Special Report: How Foreign
Capital Is Manipulating China’s Stock Markets’,
China Business 22 January: A9.
9 Due to the relatively cheap prices as well as RMB
appreciation expectations, Hong Kong residents’
investment in Mainland’s real estates totalled
15 billion yuan; an increase of 11 per cent over 2005
(Lianhe Zao Bao (2007) Singapore, 20 February: 19).
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